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HIDING BEHIND THE CORPORATE
VEIL: A GUIDE FOR NON-PROFIT
CORPORATIONS WITH FOR-PROFIT
SUBSIDIARIES
Seong J. Kim*

I. INTRODUCTION
The non-profit industry holds a unique position in the economic and
social functions of the United States. The countless varieties of non-profit
organizations are often labeled as the "third," "charitable," "voluntary,"
"philanthropic," "civil society," and "tax-exempt" sector of the economy
and receive favorable treatment.1 Currently, federal tax law exempts
charities, often referred to as 501(c)(3) organizations, from paying federal
income tax and allows them to receive tax deductible contributions. 2
Although there is a general assumption that non-profit organizations
exercise a position that is independent from the government and private
sectors, this is assumption is misguided. 3 On the contrary, numerous nonprofits exercise close governance and financial relationships with both the
government and private sectors. 4 Often times non-profit organizations earn
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009; Bachelor of
Science, Business Administration, with Honors, Bachelor of Arts, Legal Studies, Distinction in General
Scholarship, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
I. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (3rd ed. 2006).
2. Tax Treatment of Charities, COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS,
http://www.cof.org/files/Documents[Legalltax&charity.pdf
3. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1.
4. Id.
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a profit and do not exclusively rely on volunteers, public, or private
support.5 In fact, many non-profits conduct their operations just like forprofit businesses, complete with large profits, handsome salaries, political
lobbyists, and invest billions of dollars in stocks and bonds.6
As the financial side of the non-profit industry is measured, it has
become increasingly clear that both the public and the government must
carefully monitor their activities. Independent Sector, an organization
created to conduct research and advocate on behalf of non-profits,
estimated that as of the late 1990's there were approximately 1.6 million
non-profit organizations in the United States. 7 By the year 2000, charitable
organizations, excluding churches, held an astounding $2.07-trillion in
assets and reported approximately $939-billion in revenues.8 However,
even with the economic significance of non-profit organizations, a unique
feature of the sector is the relative freedom it enjoys. 9 Within the
boundaries of the law, individuals are generally able to create non-profit
organizations to pursue any idea or program they desire.' 0 Unlike the
government, non-profit organizations are not required to gain support from
a large constituency." Similarly, unlike the business sector, non-profit
organizations do not have
to pursue only those ideas that have the potential
2
to become profitable.'
Because of the unique regulatory positions of non-profit
organizations, favorable tax treatment, and potential to earn large profits,
the non-profit sector is ripe for abuse. Private foundations for example
have become "great warehouses of untaxed wealth" that provide these nonprofit organizations with great economic power. 13 Additionally, dozens of
non-profit directors and executives are also officers of outside companies
that engage in business activities with non-profit organizations.' 4 What
compounds this problem and allows abuse is the fact that the Internal
Revenue Service is so understaffed compared to the increasing number of
exempt organizations, that it has become administratively impossible to
audit all of them at the present rate.1
In this article I intend to address an emerging and complex problem

5. Id.
6. GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT ECONOMY 4 (1993).
7. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 17.

8. Id.
9. JOHN W. GARDNER, The Independent Sector, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT xiii (Brian
O'Connell ed., 1983).
10. Id.
11.Id.
12. Id.
13. GAUL & BOROWSKI, supra note 6.

14. Id.
at 5.
15. Id.
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surrounding non-profit corporations. I will analyze whether or not a party
should be able to pierce the corporate veil of a non-profit corporation for
actions of their for-profit subsidiary. In examining the issue, I will look at
the responsibilities and standards of both non-profit and for-profit
corporations. I will then attempt to reconcile the two areas of law and
argue that the equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil should be
available in the non-profit sector. I plan to show how this issue is
complicated by the different underlying principles and premises
surrounding the formation of non-profit organizations and for-profit
Finally, I will propose a number of changes in the
corporations.
regulations to attach greater liability to officers of non-profit organizations,
and to increase responsibility while reducing abuse.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to determine the scope of the legal rights and privileges of
non-profit organizations and their officers, it is necessary to understand the
underlying premises surrounding their creation. Without understanding the
rationale behind granting favorable treatment to non-profit organizations, it
becomes extremely difficult to decide whether to those privileges should be
revoked. Unfortunately, the reasons why non-profit organizations exist
have been subject to a large amount of debate.
A common understanding surrounding the creation of non-profit
organizations centers on history. It is argued that American philanthropy
began with the Indians of the Bahama Islands who greeted Columbus on
his first arrival into the New World. 16 Accordingly, there are countless
other stories of Indians offering practical assistance to white settlers as
more colonists began arriving in America. 1 7 This philanthropic movement
in turn spurred efforts by white colonists to create communities better than
the ones they had left in Europe.18 In his Essays to Do Good, Cotton
Mather is credited with beginning the modem American philanthropic
movement.' 9 It is argued that by urging men and women to engage in "a
perpetual endeavor to do good in the world," Mather's had set the stage for
the creation of non-profit organizations.
Others attribute the creation of non-profit organizations to more
pragmatic reasons rather than just mere existence through history. Two
contrary arguments that have been made involve the twin failures of the

16. ROBERT H. BREMNER, AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 5 (2d ed. 1988).
17. Id.

18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 12.
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market and the government.
The failure surrounding the market exists
because it is driven by consumer demand. 2' While the market is responsive
to the goods and services that we consume individually, such as food and
clothes, the market is generally irresponsive to things consumed
collectively, such as safe neighborhoods and clean air.22 In order to account
for this disparity, non-profits organizations act as non-market providers of
collective goods and services.23 Government failures on the other hand
refer to the inherent restraints on the government's ability to provide
support in the limitless interests of the public.24 Like the market failures
argument, non-profit organizations are said to exist in order to fill the gap
in services that the government is not able to provide.25
It is important to distinguish between the different explanations of
why non-profit organizations exist in order to determine how much
deference to provide them. The argument that non-profit organizations
should be given deference to govern themselves holds less weight if the
explanation and purpose for their existence is that they have always
existed. However, if non-profit organizations were created to fill gaps in
society resulting from market and government failures; it makes more
sense to give them deference to allow them to keep providing such
services. This issue is complicated by the fact that numerous other
explanations exist for the creation non-profit organizations. Ideas that nonprofit organizations exist to promote the values of pluralism or so
democratic societies can "express solidarity throuh joint action" are a
combination of historical and pragmatic arguments. In these instances, it
is foggy and unclear how much deference should be given to these nonprofit organizations.
Aside from the different theories regarding why non-profit
organizations exist and how they came to be, it is also essential to analyze
the rationale behind granting them favorable legal treatment.
Almost all charities receive their favorable tax exempt status under
§501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.27 §501(c)(3) organizations
include all those:
[O]perated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes... [provided

20. LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 13 (Lester Salamon ed.,
The Foundation Center 2d. 1999); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 44.
21. Id.at 12.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
at 13.
Id.
FISHMAN

& SCHWARZ, supra note I, at 44.

Id. at 327.
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that] no part of the net earnings of the organization inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial
part of the activities of which is carry on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.. .and which does
not participate in, or intervene in any2 8political campaign on
behalf of any candidate for public office.
Additional benefits include public recognition, eligibility for federal,
state, and local grants, tax exempt contributions, free public service
announcements, and cheaper mailing rates.29
Some §501(c)(3)
organizations may even benefit through exemptions under antitrust,
securities, labor, bankruptcy, and other regulatory regimes. 30 However,
there must be a reason for giving non-profit organizations all of these legal
and tax exemptions. Furthermore, we must determine whether these nonprofit organizations "deserve" this preferential treatment.
One of the most common and optimistic views in support of nonprofit organizations focuses on the "public benefit" that they provide.3'
Like the government failure and market failure theories, the public benefit
analysts argue that non-profit organizations provide services that fall
outside the scope of the government for one of two reasons.32 First, a
private enterprise may be able to do a better specific job in a particular
sector. 33 Second, the American policies of decentralization allow nonprofit organizations to provide services that are inappropriate for the
government. 34 Consequently, non-profit organizations are able to provide
these public services without reference to politics or other undesirable
influences. 35 From this viewpoint, it makes sense for the government to
provide non-profit organizations more deference to conduct their activities
as they see fit. Under this theory, non-profit organizations are essentially
relieving the government from services they would otherwise have to
provide. Regardless of why the government cannot or does not provide
these services, in this model, non-profit organizations are seen as separate
from the government and private sectors. Assuming that these reasons for
granting non-profit organizations favorable treatment are true, it would be
counterintuitive to require them to abide by stricter government controls.
This is because theorists in this model have pointed to the negative
28. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2008).
29. Tony Rhodin, Benefits of Being a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit, THE TONY RHODIN BLOG, Oct. 22,
2004, http://blog.pennlive.com/tonyrhodin/2007/10/benefits-of being._a_501c3_nonp.html.
30. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 327.
31. Id. at 328.
32. Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its
History and Underlying Policy.
33. Id. at 329.
34. Id.
35. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 330.
36. Id. at 331.
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consequence of those particular controls as the reasons that non-profit
organizations exist separately from the government.
Although the public benefit theory is one of the most often cited
rationales behind granting non-profit organizations favorable legal
treatment, it is not the only possible explanation. Income measurement
theorists take a less optimistic view of non-profit organizations and argue
that we cannot view their favorable treatment as a purely natural
occurrence. 37 Instead, income measurement theorists argue that non-profit
organizations receive favorable tax treatment, simply because it would be
contradictory and conceptually difficult to compute their "net income. 38
These difficulties include issues such as what to allow as a "business"
deduction, what the appropriate tax rate should be, and a lack of reasonable
certainty regarding who the ultimate beneficiaries will be.39 Under the
income measurement theory, it is questioned whether or not a non-profit
organization should be considered to be merely a conduit through which
funds move from a donor to the ultimate recipients.4 ° If this explanation is
accepted as true, it can be argued the non-profit organization's income
should be imputed to the ultimate beneficiary.4 By doing so, the amount
of donations could be taxed more accurately at the individual personal tax
rates. 42 However, the very nature of non-profit organizations
makes the
43
ultimate beneficiary unknown before disbursements.
It is this very
contradiction that income measurement theorist attempt to avoid by
exempting non-profit organizations from certain taxes.
Like the different theories regarding how non-profit organizations
came to be, the different explanations for granting them favorable treatment
provides guidance on how much deference to allow them. Under the public
benefit theory, it would make sense to provide non-profit organizations
with a greater degree of independence. This is because non-profit
organizations are providing services not supplied through government and
private entities. For one reason or another, government and private entities
are not capable of fulfilling this gap. Consequently, under this rationale,
non-profit organizations should be able to provide their services as they see
fit.
Unfortunately, the public benefits theory may be overly optimistic
concerning the purpose and motives of non-profit organizations. There
have been countless concerns about whether or not non-profit organizations
37. Id.
38. Boris 1.Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations From
FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE L. J. 299, 307 (1976).
39. Id. at 334-36.
40. Id. at 333.
41. Id. at 336.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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actually provide as much public benefit as it was originally though. For
example, many critics argue that non-profit organizations fail to actually
disperse a significant amount of their investment income. 4 In these
instances, people have argued that the amount of tax and legal benefits
provided to non-profit organizations should be limited to what they
"actually do to improve the world.A 5 Additionally, these critics point out
those non-profit organizations may actually provide more harm than
good.46 Because non-profit organizations are granted favorable tax exempt
treatment, there is an erosion of the tax base that must be picked up by
home owners and small businesses.47 For example, in Baltimore Maryland,
while one out of every five jobs is provided by the non-profit sector, the
estimated price of that to local taxation is around $70-million. This sum
is larger than the cities general funds deficit for the year.49 In the city of
Berkeley, California, the proportion of benefit to harm is even more
staggering. The tax losses from non-profit organizations from Berkeley
were two thirds as large as the taxes actually collected. 50
The problem with tax exemptions and favorable legal treatment for
non-profit foundations are compounded by the services that they do not
provide. Many non-profit organizations are using the favorable tax and
legal treatment to provide services and goods that compete with existing
for-profit businesses. 5 1 Additionally, critics argue that we have lost sight of
what are truly "public benefits. ' 2 This is compounded by the fact that it is
difficult to evaluate the value of non-profit services and the reluctance of
local governments to relate with these organizations. 3 Although it seems
overly simplified, under the public benefits theory, in order for favorable
tax and legal treatment to be justified, non-profit organizations must
actually provide what they are thought to provide. For example, favorable
tax exemptions could help leverage the cost of lost tax revenues through
the social services provided by the non-profit organizations. 4
Unfortunately, because this is not often the case, we must carefully
consider whether non-profit organizations should be provided favorable
44. Sean Stannard, Mission Related Investing, TACTICAL PHILANTHROPY: CHRONICLING THE
SECOND GREAT WAVE OF PHILANTHROPY (2007), http://tacticalphilanthropy.com/2007/05/missionrelated-investing#comment-28 1.
45. Id.
46. Susan Raymond, The Tax Man Cometh- Should Non-profits Pay?, ON PHILANTHROPY, July

25, 2004, http://www.onphilanthropy.com/site/News2?id=6189&page=NewsArticle.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Paul Atkinson, Taking Advantage of the Non-profit Sector's Potential. Policy Priorities,(Sept.

2006), availableat http://gem.sciences-po.fr/content/publications/pdf/AtkinsonTaking-advantage0906.pdf.
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treatment when the public good they provide is limited.
Similarly, the argument for greater deference makes less sense under
an income measurement theory. First, it must be noted that the actual merit
of the income measurement test has been questioned. For example, law
and economics theorists claim that non-profit organizations can accurately
be calculated, and they are exempt from taxes because they lack access to
equity capital. 55 Second, if non-profit organizations receive favorable tax
treatment simply because it would be difficult to compute the taxes, it
seems that the favorable treatment should be less absolute.
Regardless of what the reasoning is behind the existence of non-profit
organizations and the rationale behind granting them favorable legal
treatment, these privileges should not be absolute. Far from the ideas of the
public benefit theorists, abuse within non-profit organizations is rampant.56
In fact, non-profit organizations are often created and operated for tax
benefits and they may even go so far as engaging in fraud.5 7 While is
undeniable that non-profit organizations as a whole provide some public
good, regulations must be tailored and adjusted to limit abuse. Although
certain tax exemptions and favorable legal treatment can assist non-profit
organizations conduct their operations, they must understand that these
benefits are a privilege rather than a right. Instead of focusing on the
charitable and voluntary nature of non-profit organizations and their
officers, we should concentrate on the actions. Because of the large
presence of non-profit organizations in our society and their potential for
abuse, we should be willing to hold non-profits organizations and even
their officers liable for their actions.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Do "VOLUNTEERS"

HAVE ANY DUTIES?

A problematic concept in the regulation of non-profit organizations
revolves around the common misunderstanding that directors and officers
on non-profit boards are essentially "volunteers." As the baby boomer
generation reaches retirement age, it has been noted that it will be
increasingly important to attract and retain highly skilled workers in all
sectors, but especially in the non-profit industry.
In fact, both Lynda
55. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations From Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 Yale L. J. 54, 72-75 (1981).
56. Albert B. Crenshaw, Tax Abuse Rampant in Nonprofits, IRS Says, WASHINGTON POST, at EOI,

(Apr. 5, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlarticles/A26388-2005Apr4.html.
57. Id.
58. Ron Saunders, Passion and Commitment Under Stress: Human Resource Issues in Canada's
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Ducharme, president of Ducharme Group Inc., an executive non-profit
recruiting agency, and Karen Iddon, national director of human resources
for the Canadian Red Cross Society, recognize that there is already
significant competition to attract top talent in the sector.5 9 While talented
individuals are attracted to the flexibility, goals, and challenges available at
non-profit organizations, a huge obstacle to overcome is that senior level
executives in the non-profit sector can take a 50 percent pay cut and still be
considered to be near the top of the non-profit salary range. 60 Additionally,
directors and non-profit officers face virtually the same exposure to
lawsuits as directors and officers of for profit corporations. 6' Because the
compensation for such non-profit positions is not proportional to the
potential liability, this can only result in more ineffective directors.62
Because there are few standards by which to measure the success of a
non-profit organization, it is difficult to govern non-profit officers and
directors. 63 Unlike a business corporation, there are no bottom line profit
margins or returns on investment that must be met. 64 Although the results
and effectiveness of non-profit organizations are intangible and difficult to
quantify, officers and directors must act in the best interests of the
organization and be cognizant of their duties.65 Regardless of whether or
not non-profit officers and directors are "volunteers," their actions must
conform to generally accepted codes of conduct.
In California, the corporate code requires that each corporation have a
board of directors that conducts the activities and affairs of the
corporation. 66
However, the California Legislature recognizes the
importance of the services provided by directors and officers of non-profit
corporations who work without compensation.67
Because of the
unavailability and high cost of appropriate liability insurance, California
finds that public policy requires incentives and protection for these
individuals to perform important functions at non-profit organizations. 68
Consequently, the corporate code generally disallows any cause of action

Non-profit Sector, available at http://www.cpm.org/doc.cfm?doc=504&1=en.
59. Louise Chatterton Luchuk, Attracting Top Talent in the Non-profit Sector, CHARITY VILLAGE
NEWSWEEK, (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.charityvillage.com/cv/archive/acov/acovO4/acov
0426. html.
60. Id.
61. See Volunteers InsuranceService, at http://www.cimaworld.com/htdocs/d&o.cfm.
62. Karen Leigh Chapman, Statutory Responses to Boardroom Fears, 1987 COLUM. BuS. L. REV.
749, 750 (1987).
63. See Thompson & Thompson, The Key to Non-profit Governance, Part 2, at http://www.ttlaw.com/np-02a.htm.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5210 (West 2007)
67. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5047.5(a) (West 2008)
68. Id.

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol.5:l

for monetary damages against any person serving without compensation as
a director or officer of a non-profit corporation. 6 This generally applies to
damages as a result of negligent acts or omissions, given the individual was
working within the scope of their duties as a director or officer in their
official capacities, in good faith, in a manner they believe to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and in the exercise of their policy making
judgment. 70 This immunity is not absolute however, and does not limit the
liability of a director or officer for abuses of power that include self
dealing, conflicts of interest, intentional, wanton, or reckless acts, gross
negligence, actions based on fraud, oppression, or malice. 71 Additionally,
any duties and liabilities set forth in the "standards of conduct" portion of
the California Corporations Code apply vwithout regard to whether a
director is compensated by the corporation.
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act expressly recommends
that states adopt generally accepted standards of conduct for both nonprofit directors and officers.73 These recommendations are, similar to the
California law and include the duty of care, the duty of loyalty and the duty
of obedience.74 The California Corporations Code explains that this
requires a director to perform their duties in good faith and in a manner that
they believe to be in the best interest of the corporation.75 Additionally, the
duty of care requires a director to use the same care that an ordinarily76
prudent person in a like position would exercise in similar circumstances.
A director or officer can violate their duty of care by either failing to
supervise the corporation or failing to make an informed decision.7 7 In
determining whether a director violated their duty of care, we must first ask
whether they acted with sufficient care in reaching their decision.7 8 Next,
we must make a substantive assessment to see if the decision was so "rash
as to warrant being set aside or imposing personal liability on the
directors."79 In the non-profit context, a director may rely on the business
judgment rule, also known as the best judgment rule. 80 This rule allows a
director to avoid both judicial inquiry and liability if the action taken was
an informed decision made without violating a conflict of interest.81

69. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5047.5(b).
70. Id.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 5047.5(c).
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5230 (West 2008).
The Key to Non-profit Governance, supra note 63.
Id.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 523 1(a) (West 2008).
76. Id.
77. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 151.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 152.
80. Id. at 168.
81. Id.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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Next, directors and officers must respect their duty of loyalty. This
duty requires directors to avoid using their position in the non-profit
organization to unlawfully obtain a personal benefit or advantage, which
might more properly belong to the non-profit organization.82 This is
codified in a variety of sections of the California Corporate Code, including
provisions that disallow self dealing transactions between the corporation
and another party, where one or more of the directors have a material
financial interest.83 Essentially, the duty of loyalty requires directors to
84
place the interests of the corporation ahead of their own personal gains.
In determining whether an officer or director should be held liable for
violating their duty of loyalty, it is necessary to analyze whether the
corporate procedural requirements for interested transactions were
followed.85 Additional factors that will be considered are the extent of
disclosure, whether the decision was impartially made, and whether86 the
interests of the director were disclosed to the relevant decision makers.
Finally, a director or officer must also fulfill their duty of obedience.
The duty of obedience requires that directors and officers follow and carry
out the mission of the organizations.87 Unless allowed by the law, the ultra
vires doctrine states that a director cannot deviate in "any substantial way"
from the duty to fulfill the particular purposes of the organization.88 Under
the Model Nonprofit Corporate Act, a director may be exposed to liability
if they enter into or complete an ultra vires transaction.89 The duty of
obedience is especially important in the non-profit sector, because unlike
for-profit corporations, non-profit organizations are defined by their
specific objectives. 90

B. THE CEMENT-LOCK MISTAKE
The problems involved regarding non-profit corporations and their
for-profit subsidiaries are exemplified in Cement-Lock v. Gas Technology
Institute.9' By using the facts of this case as a model, we will be able to
better analyze the duties and liabilities of non-profit directors and officers.

82. Id. at 176.
83. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233 (West 2008).
84. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supranote 1, at 176.
85. Id. at 179.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 219.
88. Id.
89. REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.04(c) (1987).
90. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 220.

91. Cement-Lock v. Gas Tech. Inst., No. 05 C 0018, 2007 WL 4246888, at *1 (N.D. 111.
November 30, 2007).
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In this current case, a Federal District Court in Illinois has refused to
dismiss a case involving a non-profit corporation's breach of fiduciary duty
by their for-profit subsidiary.9 2 This case is centered on a number of fraud
and racketeering claims arising from a failed effort to commercialize a
technological process that converts waste into a beneficial cement
additive. 93 The Institute for Gas Technology ("IGT") is a non-profit
corporation that is involved in research in both natural gas and related
projects.94 Endesco Services, Inc. ("ESI") is a wholly owned subsidiary of
IGT that has a stated mission to "design, construct, and operate a 100,000
ton cement manufacturing facility to process contaminated harbor sediment
from the New York/New Jersey harbor area using the pro,riety CementESI was a
Lock Technology of the Institute of Gas Technology."
member of the Cement-Lock Group ("CLG'), which owned the intellectual
property rights to that process. 96 Among other things, other members of
CLG filed a derivative suit on behalf of CLG and argued that ESI has
breached their fiduciary duty to CLG.97 Because of this breach, CLG
argues that they should be able to pierce the corporate veil to impose
liability on IGT. 98
Since ESI is a wholly owned subsidiary of IGT, IGT would be bound
by fiduciary duties to CLG only if it would be appropriate to pierce the
corporate veil between ESI and IGT. 99 Under Illinois law, this can only
happen when a two part test is satisfied. 00 First, "there must be such unity
of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual or other corporation no longer exist."' 0 1 Second,
"circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of separate
corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.' 0 2
In determining if there is a unity of interest and ownership, Illinois
law focuses on four factors. 0 3 These include the failure to maintain
adequate records or abide by corporate formalities, the mixing of funds and
assets, undercapitalization, and one corporation treating the assets of

92. Don Kramer, Court Refuses to Dismiss Effort to Pierce Corporate Veil, NONPROFIT ISSUES,
(Nov. 1-30, 2007), available at http://www.nonprofitissues.com/public/features/lead/2007novl-IS4.html (subscription required).
93. Id.
94. Cement-Lock, 2007 WL 4246888, at *4.
95. Id.
at *6.
96. Id.
at *3.
at *28.
97. Id.
98. id.
at *44.
99. Id.at *40
100. Id.
101. Id.at *40 41.
102. Id.at *41.
103. Id.
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another as if they were its own. 104
In Cement-Lock, the issues are complicated by the fact that there was
evidence of unacceptable conduct on the part of IGT in their operation and
control of ESI. The Illinois court recognized that "the mere fact that ESI 0is5
a subsidiary of IGT is not sufficient to meet the test for piercing."'
Additionally, a parent corporation is generally free from the liable acts of
its subsidiaries. ° 6 However, in this case, there was no evidence that ESI
ever held any board meetings whatsoever. 10 7 What was even more
deplorable was that Borys, the person who signed CLG Unanimous Written
Consents, did not even know whether they were signing on behalf of IGT
or ESI 10 8 Other factors that gave the appearance of mismanagement
included the fact that ESI was thinly capitalized and there was an "utter
lack of documentation" of any corporate formalities.' 0 9 At this stage, this
evidence suggests that the Plaintiffs will be able to show a unity of interest
and ownership. 110 Because a reasonable fact-finder could determine that
ESI was intended to insulate IGT from fiduciary obligations to CLG, the
jury is entitled to determine if ESI's corporate veil should be pierced.' 11
C.

CAN AND SHOULD THE CORPORATE VEIL BE PIERCED IN CEMENT-LOCK
SITUATIONS?

In determining if a non-profit corporation like IGT should be liable for
actions of its for-profit subsidiaries, we must analyze a number of other
issues. First, it is necessary to determine if an operation of a for-profit
subsidiary by a non-profit corporation is permissible. Section 502 of the
Internal Revenue Code generally states that an organization that is operated
with a primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit shall
not enjoy tax exempt status merely because all of its profits are payable to
However, it is not unusual for a
one or more tax exempt organizations.
that is a for-profit
a
subsidiary
to
have
non-profit organization
113 Generally, there is no problem with this arrangement as
corporation.
long as the non-profit organization owns 100 percent of the subsidiary
104. Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *43.
Id.
Id. at *43-44.

110. Id.

11. Id. at *4445.
112. 26 C.F.R. § 1.502 (2008).
113. Don Kramer, Can a 501(c)(3)(c) Charity (a hospital) Have a For-Profit Subsidiary That is
Taxed as a "C" Corporation?, NONPROFIT ISSUES, at http://www.nonprofitissues.com/public/
features/point/257.htmi.
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stock."14 Although there are no bright line tests of to what extent a nonprofit organization can carry on commercial activity without jeopardizing
their tax exempt status, there are regulations that provide that the articles of
incorporation of a non-profit may not expressly empower them to engage in
more than an "insubstantial part" of unrelated activities that do not further
their exempt purposes."' For the sake of argument, let us assume that nonprofit organizations in the Cement-Lock type situations are allowed to own
their for-profit subsidiaries without losing their tax exempt status.
Next, we must analyze the remedy of piercing the corporate veil. A
corporation generally exists as a separate entity, in a state that is
independent of its owners. 1 6 Generally, a corporation's separate legal
existence insulates its shareholders from liability. 1 7 Through the legal
fiction of a corporation, a shareholder can reduce the amount of liabilities
to the amount of their investments, and not for the debts of the individual
corporation. " 8 Piercing the corporate veil is the most radical form of
shareholder liability. 19 In causes of creditor protection, the court may set
aside the entity status of the corporation and hold its shareholders directly
liable for contract or tort obligations. 120 However, courts will only pierce
the corporate veil in unusual circumstances, including the prevention of
fraud, to promote equity, to prevent the violation of law, or to promote
public policy. 121 Because of the extreme nature of piercing the corporate
veil, courts will generally only apply the doctrine in cases where corporate
actors misuse the corporate form
22 for their own personal gain, rather than
the business of the corporation. 1
To determine whether the corporate veil should be pierced, courts
have come up with a number of tests that primarily focuses on the
relationship between the controlling persons of the corporation and the
corporation itself. The first of these tests is the Alter Ego test. Under the
Alter Ego test, the separate existence of a corporation will not be respected
if a controlling person can exercise so much influence over the corporation
that there is a unity of both ownership and interest. 123 Additionally, the
Alter Ego test will allow the piercing of the corporate veil if adhering to the
legal fiction of a separate entity would perpetuate a fraud or promote
114. Id.
115. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i) (2008).
116. Mathew D. Caudill, Piercing the Corporate Veil of a New York Not-for-profit Corporation, 8

FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 463 (2003).
117. Id.

118. Id.
119. WILLIAM ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 151 (2d ed. 2007).

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Caudill, supranote 116, at 463.
Id.
Id.at 464.
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injustice. 124 The rationale surrounding the Alter Ego test is: if a
of a corporation as a separate
shareholder does not respect the 1boundaries
25
legal entity, neither will the laws.
The second test is the Instrumentality test. Under the Instrumentality
test, the corporate veil will be pierced between a parent corporation and a
subsidiary if there was complete dominion over a transaction to the extent
that the subsidiary had no will or existence of its own. 126 Additionally, it
must be shown that the defendant used such dominion to commit fraud or
some wrong, and the dominion was the proximate cause of the loss or
unjust injury.'
The third test is the Equity test. Courts who are dissatisfied with both
the Alter Ego and Instrumentality test have created their own equitable tests
that focus on the particular factors of a case.128 These factors include
undercapitalization, failure to observe the formalities of corporate
existence, nonpayment or overpayment of dividends, misuse of
129 funds, and
guarantees for corporate liability by the majority shareholders.
Finally, courts have also pierced the corporate veil in instances where
corporate form to violate laws, perpetuate
the defendants have utilized the
1 30
fraud, or other public policies.
In analyzing whether we can pierce the veil of a non-profit
corporation for the actions of a for profit subsidiary, we must determine
whether the piercing doctrine is applicable to non-profit organizations. In
Macaluso v. Jenkins, an Illinois appellate court held that a non-profit
organization could have their corporate veil pierced as an equitable
remedy. 131 In Macaluso, the defendant used the non-profit corporation for
32
his own personal gain and controlled its funds for his own personal use.
The court held that the defendant could be held personally liable for the
debts of the non-profit if it can be shown that she fraudulently made
funds, or violated a fiduciary duty
misrepresentations, misappropriated
3
through gross negligence.

In the Cement-Lock scenario, it seems apparent that the corporate veil
can and should be pierced. First, under the Instrumentality test, it is
apparent that IGT exercised control over their for-profit subsidiary.

124. Id.
125. Id. at 465.
126. Id.
127. Id.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.at 466.
Id.
Id.
Macaluso v. Jenkins, 95 111.App. 3d 461,469 (1981).
Id.
at 463.
Id.
at 469.
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However, it is questionable whether IGT used their dominion over ESI to
commit fraud or some wrong. Here, it is clear that exercising ownership
over a subsidiary is not enough to justify piercing the corporate veil.
Additionally, the fact that IGT handled and completed the financial
documents of ESI is not in itself conclusive.
What we must rely on in order to pierce the corporate veil between
IGT and ESI is the Equity test. It is apparent that the corporate formalities
were almost completely disregarded by IGT. There was no evidence that
there had ever been any board meetings, there was a lack of documentation,
there was undercapitalization, and even officers of IGT were unclear about
the relationship between ESI and CLG.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Cement-Lock scenario involves many different players
and confusing transactions, it exemplifies that corporate formalities must
be followed. Regardless of the fact that IGT is a non-profit corporation and
ESI is supposed to be shielded from liability through incorporation,
insulation from liabilities will not necessarily follow unless the separate
legal status of subsidiaries are respected. Unless both parent and subsidiary
companies have been following the rules all along, courts may be reluctant
to respect the legal fiction behind treating corporations as a separate entity.
Generally, non-profit corporations must be careful to conduct the
business of their for-profit subsidiaries in a manner that respects their
independent status. Although non-profit organizations are generally given
favorable legal treatment, this should not act as a shield against liability in
all instances. When the favorable statuses of non-profit organizations have
been misused to inure personal or inappropriate gains, those favorable laws
The issue is
should no longer insulate defendants from liability.
complicated however, by the fact that non-profit directors and officers are
often viewed as "volunteers." Regardless of whether or not non-profit
officers are volunteering their time to promote public good, they should not
be granted a total shield from liabilities. Instead, the courts should look at
the control that these individuals exercise over the organization. In
instances where non-profit directors and officers are using the non-profit
organization for their own personal gain, they have violated their duty of
obedience and duty of loyalty. Additionally, the other board members who
have been ignorant of the problem or have refused to resolve it are guilty of
violating their duty of care.
Because the remedy of piercing the corporate veil of a non-profit
corporation is extremely severe, it should only be used in the most
egregious cases. It is undeniable that non-profit originations provide
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countless services for the public. Additionally, it has become increasingly
difficult to attract and maintain qualified officers. By imposing severe
punishment for non-profit directors and officers, the courts can essentially
deter talented individuals from entering the non-profit sector. In analyzing
the issue of whether or not to pierce the corporate veil of a non-profit
organization, I would suggest the court look beyond the basic standards for
piercing the veil of a typical corporation. The courts should also consider
whether the non-profit organization itself should be held liable or whether
it would be sufficient to punish the individuals who were committing the
crimes.
Unfortunately, non-profit organizations are difficult to regulate.
Because non-profit organizations do not have shareholders, there are only a
limited number of people who ensure they fulfill their stated purposes.
Although the Attorney General is responsible for enforcing non-profit
activities, the utter lack of resources provides huge potential for misuse.
While the media does provide a watchful eye, it is often difficult to uncover
schemes where the non-profit status of an organization is being abused.
What I would suggest is a process of verification that holds directors
and officers of non-profit organizations responsible for the transactions that
occur under their control. By doing so, it ensures that officers and directors
pay attention to the activities of the organization and fulfill their duty of
obedience. Furthermore, to make sure this does not discourage individuals
from entering the non-profit sector, I would suggest that there be a
presumption against personal liability. However, this presumption should
be able to be overcome if a director or officer fails to observe or regulate
the activities of the non-profit in gross negligence. Through this process,
non-profit directors and officers can enjoy a buffer zone of liability without
jeopardizing the presence and status of non-profit organizations in our
society.
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